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FALLOUT FROM THE 
SADAT VISIT 
by Howard Adelman 
The visit affected substantive issues, the balance of alliances, 
and above all, the images of the parties. An analysis of each 
of these suggests why Egypt is winning the "War of Images." 
" I allou t" has at least three con no-
Ultlons. rhere is (1 neutrili one 5ug-
gc~ti ng the ev(:~ nts that occu r as a 
re,Ld t of an action. There is a nega-
live one referr ing to the quality of 
sp('c ific after-effects such as a fa ll -
out illnong friends resulting in quar-
rel ing. The third con notation is sin is-
tCI ,1nci probably rhe c10minant one 
in this post-Hiroshima age. It sug-
gests an unseen lurking dange r with 
,II I k inds of unknown hideous con5e-
qu\!nces. These con notat ions rough-
ly correlate with the three topi cs 
undE'r wh ich one can ana lyze the 
It'sults o f the Sadat vi si t: iss ues, alli-
ances and irnages. 
ISSUES 
PEACE. The Sadat vis it by and large 
["('\olved one of the major prob lems 
in l lw dispute between Israe l and 
Iwr Ara h neighbours '- the prob lem 
or the conception of peace. Israe l 
hac! insisted that peace mu st mean 
full peace dnd the development of 
<111 normal dip lomat ic, economi c, 
traell', ;~ nd tour ist relat. ions between 
ne ighbouring cou ntries. /\g reements 
hile! to rt'<;ul t not on Iy in the cessa-
HOward ,\de lman. Professor of Philosophy ill 
Alkln , on College, York Universit y, i~ vi~itil1g 
i'rOfe."or ill the U"brew Universily in ·I'177-71i. 
tion of hostilities and a new non-
belligerent status quo, bu t in posi-
t ive peaceful contacts at all leve ls 
of soc iet.y to blow away the sand 
curtain that separates Israe l from 
the rest of the M idd le East. 
Sadat's v isit in part accomplished 
that altered conception. For Egypt 
declared its readiness for a full 
peace as Israe l dep icts it, in contrast 
to its former stand that rea l peace 
wou Id take a long t.ime to develop 
and the most that could be accom-
p lished in the interval was a sta te of 
non-belligerency. /\I so a majority of 
Jewish Israe lis now beli eve that 
Egypt is Si ncerely interested in 
peace. This changed attitude was a 
direct result of Sada t's visit . And ac-
cord ing to Professor Cuttm an's Con-
tinuing Survey of Israeli public 
opin ion, that changed attitude has 
remained in spite of the multitudes 
of 'downs' in the peace mak ing pro-
cess since the Sac/at vis i t. 
The change in the issue of the nature 
of peace demonstrated in t he most 
dramatic way by Sad at's vis it, and 
also Israeli be lief in the Sincerity 
and depth of that cha nge, is, how-
ever only a partial change. It is 
part ial because a major bell igerent 
is unaffected bV it. Syria has not 
cha nged its definition of peace. Fur-
ther, Israelis are as conv inced as 
ever that Syria is not interested in 
peace and they will have to f ight 
another war in the next f ive years. 
Sadat came to Jerusa lem to resolve 
that large part of t he problem which 
he declared to be ·psychological. 
The very fact of his com ing, irres-
pective of what was said, dealt w ith 
on ly part of the prob lem, the defi-
nition of peace and left the substa n-
tive issues of territories, se lf-deter-
mination for the Palestinia ns and 
self-defence capabi liti es for the 
Israe lis unreso lved. 
If Sadat's vis it so lved part of one of 
the issues, what did it do to the 
others? Let us begin with the two 
issues t hat pr imarily concern both 
sides in turn, se lf-determination for 
the Palestinians and self-defence for 
the Israe lis, and then deal with the 
t hird that overlaps all others, t he 
problem of territories. 
PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINA_ 
TION Self-determination for which 
Palestinians, and within what limits 
w ill they be allowed to exerc ise their 
self-determ ination? 
The Israe lis had always insisted that 
the PLO did not and would not be 
allowed to represent t he Pa lestini-
ans. Even before Sadat left for his 
historic vis i t to Jerusalem, the Egyp-
t ians, in their discussions of the pro-
cedural questions about Geneva 
had already given up their ins i stenc~ 
that the PLO represent the Pa lestin-
ians. However, one day after we 
read reports that Sadat had backed 
down on a direct rol e fo r the PLO at 
Geneva, Hodding Carter III , the U,S. 
State Departm ent spokesm an, insi s-
ted to reporters that the U.S . _ 
Israe l working paper negotiated 
with Dayan d id not deny a PLO pre-
sence in Ceneva . Since th is fo llowed 
earlier leaks of the American 
demand for a PLO presence, Israelis 
were conv inced that they were on a 
collision course w it.h the U.S. over 
the role of the PLO . 
One of the c lear effects, whether in-
direct or direct, of the Sadat v isit to 
Jerusalem has been President 
Ca rter's more or less exp l icit write-
off of a ro le for the PLO. The Israelis 
had won on this issue not only with 
Egypt but, more importantly with 
the U.S., anc/ Sadat appeared to de-
serve the credit for bringing the U.s. 
and Israel together on th is issue, 
eVEm though it remained unresolved 
for other crucia l interested parties 
- Syria, the Soviet Union, and of 
course, the PLO. 
Which Pa lest inians are to be rep re-
sented? First of all , they are Pal es-
tinian Arabs ilnd not Palestinian 
Jews. Secondly, they are no longer 
defined as Palestinian refugees. fo r 
some Arab leaders have come to re-
alize that would raise the question 
of representation for Jewish refu-
gees from Arab lands who did not go 
to Israe l and whom Israe l does not 
represent. For that reason and 
others, such as the PLO dom in at ion 
of refugee camps in Lebanon, there 
has been a convergence of views on 
this issue as well between the U.S., 
Is rae l and Egypt. 
The Pa lestinians to be rep resented 
wi ll be reS idents of the Gaza strip 
and the West Bank . A lthough this 
represented a shift from Israel 's for-
mer position that its dispute was 
w ith Arab states and no l t hp Pa les-
tin ian Arabs in part icu lar, th is sh ift 
had been made pri or to Sadat's visit 
and was speCi fi ca ll y enunc iated in 
the Israe l-U.S. worki ng paper on 
Geneva . The resul t of the Sadat v isi t 
was to conf irm the U.S. in this pos i-
tion as we l l. 
The d ispute whic h has come into 
clearer focus subsequent to the 
Sadat v isit has been the te rm s under 
wh ich Pales tini an A rabs in the West 
Ba nk and GaLa w ill be allowed to 
exercise t heir po li t ica l r ights. The 
most im porta nt aspect of thi s is 
whether they will be permi tted to 
dec ide to have their own state. The 
Israe lis have consistently and ada-
mantly opposed ~h i s . On th is issue 
the Am eri cans seem to have 
expli c itly l ined lip with Israe l. Egypt 
had in5is ted that Pales tinians se lf-
determ inat ion included t he right to 
their own sta te, though they 
expressed a pre ference for a linkage 
of that state w ith Jordan . Though it 
is not c lear, fo llow ing t he Carter-
Sada t lalks irl Ameri ca in Februa ry, 
one has the impress ion that agree-
ment CO l' lei be reac hed on a West 
1 ilnk and CaLi! ent i ty strongly 
linked to Jordan. 
Where Sadat has not budged and 
where the U.S. seems to have con-
sistent ly backed him is on the issue 
of Pa lest inian Arab rights to deter-
mine who can and who cannot sett.le 
in the West Ba nk . On th is issue, both 
the govern ing coa l i l ion (lnd the op-
po, it ion in Israe l are opposed to 
handing over unrestri cted rights, 
whil e mos t of the coali t ion are op-
posed to any lega l res tri · lion of 
Jew ish settlement in any part of the 
West Bank . The Labour opposition 
and part o f the coa lition seem to be 
concern ed only w ith preventing res-
tr ict ions related to loca tions con-
sidered necessary for Israe li se l f-
defence. The Israe li s are sp lit over 
whether it is a practical issue or an 
issue of principl e. 
Fina lly, it is not cl ear where Sadat 
stands on the Pa les tini an ri ght to de-
t ermine their own defence needs. 
He seems w illing to delegate that 
right to Jord an and adamantly op-
posed to Israe l con t inuing to be re-
sponsibl e for the securi ty of the 
WeSl Bank and Caza. On thi s issue 
the U.S. seems to be backing Israel 
and there is no clear ind ication that 
Egypt and Israe l are closer on this 
issue tha n they were prior to Sadat's 
visit. 
ISRAEL'S SElF-DEFENCE Sadat 
st ated categorica lly in his Jerusalem 
address that he understood Israe l's 
need f or securi ty and he was w ill ing 
to give whatever guar,lntees seemed 
necessa ry as long as t here was a 
tot.a l Israe l i w ithdrawa l of its m ili-
tary forces from Arab terri tory. 
Peres, in res ponse to Sadat's speech 
in the Knesset, noted that security 
arrangements whi ch d id not allow 
for se l f-defence would be inade-
quate. Dayan, in a subsequent Is-
raeli tel evi sion intervi ew, succinct ly 
summar ized the differences. "When 
Sadat says he recogni zes Israel'$ 
need for security, he immediately 
adds a definition of security . .. se-
CLnity (to Sadat) does not mean de-
fensibl e bord ers, or t erritor ies, or 
strai ts, but arrangements, demili ta ri -
zation, trea t ies, warning stations 
and guarantees." 
The Israe lis do not wa nt to place ul-
ti mate rel iance on a U.N. o r a U.S. 
presence to act as a cordon sa nitil ire 
be tween Gaza and Egyp t. Thi s is 
why Isra el wa nts to reta in a military 
and c ivil ian presence in the Rafiah 
approaches. This is why the issue 
over Ya mi t became so prominent 
prior to the breakdown in the po l i-
t ica l talks in Jerusalem. The Israel is 
are unwilling t.o give up their air-
f ields in the Sin ai ad jacent to Eilat 
and Yamit, at least until all Arab 
cou ntri es have co rnpl eted a full 
peace w ith Israe l and t his peace has 
had a chance to prove itse lf. 
Al though the United States seems to 
be syrnpathetic to Israel on this 
issue, there is cert.ainly no indication 
that there has been a convergence 
between Israel and Egypt, particu-
larly when Muhamecl Ibrahim 
Kam el, the Egyptian Foreign Min-
ister makes a statement insisting on 
total Israeli withdrawl from all Arab 
terr itory inc luding a spec ific refer-
ence to the Gol an heights, which, in 
the hands of an int ractable enerny 
would threaten the whole of the 
Huleh valley in the north of Israel. 
For Israeli s, security is a matter of 
self-defence and not o f guarantees . 
TERRITORIES. I t is clear that the 
prob lem of the terri tories involves 
not on ly issues of self-determination 
and se lf -defence, but is compl icated 
by notions that seem extraneous to 
most outs iders and many insiders. 
These include emotional attach-
ments to sites for rel igious, histori-
cal or other reasons. Thus Yamit, ini-
tia lly establ ished for defence 
purposes to pu t an Israe li presence 
between Gaza and terri tory that 
would be returned to Egypt, 
assumes an intern al Israe l i polit ica l 
importance when the presen t inhabi-
ta nts have es tabl ished roots, busi-
nesses, agri cul ture and a v iable 
community. There is no problem of 
self-determin ation here, except pos-
sibly, for the very recent Israe li set-
t lers. The issue of self-defence for 
some Israelis is now overshadowed 
by the commitment by the previous 
government, now leading t he oppo-
sition, and the existing governm ent 
to those settl ers. 
At the other end of the spectrum is 
the probl em of East Jerusa lem, in-
cl uding the Old City . Should the 
Arab inhab itant.s o f East Jerusalem 
be allowed to determine that this 
part of t he c ity be severed f rom the 
Jewish part? Shou ld the majori ty of 
the inhabi tants of the o ld city deter-
m ine i ts fatf' and hence the fate of 
the Jewish quarter itse l f? Since the 
midd le of the nineteenth century 
when Jerusa lem was on ly the old 
city with a population of 5,000, the 
majority of the in hab itants of the 
who le city has always been Jewish. 
In which segment of territory - a 
part of a who le city, a who le city, or 
a whole reg ion - shou ld se lf-deter-
mination be implemented? 
Israe lis are overwhelm ingly commit -
ted to the retent ion of Jerusa lem 
and its imrnediate surroundings . O n 
the occas ion of Sadat's visit, King 
Khal ed of Saudi Arabia, Sada t 's fin-
ancial backer, urged Arabs to unite 
to liberate Jerusa lem and the EI 
Aqsa mosque from Israeli occupa-
tion . Sad at sti l l interprets U.N. reso-
lutions 242 and 338 as ca lling for the 
return of al l Ara b terri tory captured 
in the 1967 War. The return o f every 
inch of the Sina i, inc lud ing Ya mit, 
has " holy" overtones beca use it 
re inforces the princ ipll' o f the retu rn 
of al l territories irrespective of t.hose 
part'> of the resolut ions that ca l l for 
SeC Uff> bO fders . 
SUMMA RY. On substantial matte rs, 
there has been no appa rent change 
on the issue of te rritories separating 
thp dispu tants There has been no 
appJrcnt shi ft in Israe li ins istence 
on )(' If-dcfence or Egyptian fai lure 
to recognize that t he issue for Israe l 
i~ (Jne of se lf-defence. There has 
bf'pn a ~ hift by F gypt on who should 
fpp resent the Palestinians and by 
Israe l in recogn izing that Pa lestin-
ian) shou ld participate in dec id ing 
tlwir own future A lthough the ('gyp_ 
tidllS have shifted somew hat to-
wards the Israe li position in discard-
ing some issues on w hat the Pales-
tin ians should decide for them-
wives , there rema in large and signi .. 
f ic ant gaps between the Egyptian 
and Israeli positions as publi cly 
presented. 
ALLIA N CES 
TI)(> biggest fa llout in the after l11 ath 
of the Sadat v isit has been the fall -
out ,)ll1ong the Arab states and the 
shift in pos iti ons of each of them. 
The PLO has clearl y joi ned the re-
jen ionist cam p, al though the oppo-
Sit ion to Israe l and Egypt has not 
hea led the breach between Iraq and 
SYri a. What is more in teresting is 
thilt Ki ng Hussein and Egypt have 
shilled roles . Jordan was previous ly 
vlewpd as the most moderate of the 
conf ron tat ion states. Now, in an 
cxce rr> t fron'l an interview with 
Hussein on Jordanian news, Husse in 
has dec lared U.N. resolution 242 to 
be dead, insisted on Israeli with-
(lraWed from all of the West Bank 
including East Jerusal em, and de: 
l11anci{'ci full se lf determination for 
the Palest inian Arabs. This was but a 
culm inat ion of " hard" speeches by 
Husspin si nce the new year. 
flu! the cont inu ing d isarray in the 
r'\ rab ca mp is ba lanced by the c loser 
proximity of the U.S and Egypti an 
Posit ion s, and also the new fi ssures 
appearing in U.S.-Israe l re lations. 
Prev iously, the d ispute focussed on 
a role for the PLO. Israe l won that 
controversy, possi bly thanks to 
Sada t. But the U.S. seems to be 
much more al igned with Egypt than 
with Israe l in its view of the quantity 
of territo ry Israel must rel inquish 
presumably on the old d ictum of a 
litt le te rr itory for a li tt le peace, a lot 
of terri to ry fo r a lot of peace. Th is of 
course is why there has been so 
mu ch con troversy over the set tl e-
ments of late. 
IMAGES 
The Sadat v isit was one of the media 
events of the century. It has been 
followed by a media war. It is a war 
that Egypt is clearly winn ing . It is 
signified by the change in altitudes 
of Israe l is to the conception of 
Egypt.ian intent ions, More import-
antly, where previous ly 8 or 9 out of 
10 Ameri cans favoured t he Israe li 
pos i tions in any Israeli-Arab dispute, 
foll owing the breakdown in the pol i-
t ica l commit.tee in JNusa lem in 
January, Americans were found in a 
survey to be eq ual ly sp l it in assign-
ing blame to the Egypt ians and 
Israel is. 
It is not just a product of the lack of 
quantity and quality in Israe li publi c 
re lations efforts in the U.S., however 
bad ly these may' need to be im-
proved. Npr is it even a matter of 
Am eric an State Depa rtm ent bias 
which is being used t.o manipul ate 
public opi nion in Egypt's fa vour. 
Wa l ter Laqu eur had predicted long 
before Sadat's v isit that t.here wou ld 
be increas ing subtl e U.S. pressure on 
Israe l and an effo rt to dep ict Israe l 
as the unreasonabl e and intractab le 
party to the conflict in contrast w ith 
the increased f lex ibi l ity in the Arab 
camp. 
The shift in Israel's image in the 
media war has been a product of 
three factors: the a tual quant ita-
t ive sh ift in pos it ions of the d isput-
ants, the issues over which those 
sh ifts have taken or not taken place, 
and the nature of the medium 
th rough which the war is being 
waged. 
In the recital of substantive issues it 
shou ld be clear that however l ittle 
sh ift there has been in t he numerous 
areas of controversy, Egypt has 
made more shifts in its pos it ion. 
Whether or not it was incumbent on 
Egyp t to shift fur ther is bes ide the 
po int when a centra l issue in the 
image war is who is being the most 
f lex ible. 
One might feel it is no t much of a 
shift in posit ion or, at leas t, if it is, it 
is an unfair comparison. If one party 
to a conflict intent on ki ll ing an-
other party says, "See, I 've la id 
down my kni f e. I no longer want to 
kill you so you don' t need your knife 
anymore", it may be unfai r to 
compare the change of pos ition of 
the person who is intent. on k il ling 
and the person in tent on defending 
himself. Bu t it is perceived as a sig-
nifica nt shift . What is more, a sign ifi-
can t port ion of American cu l ture be-
lieves in sudden transformations 
and rad ica l re ligious conversions. It 
is a Significant shift in position 
wh ich fils a dom inant strain in the 
Amer,ican imagination, 
It is not only the quantity and char-
acter of the shifts in position that 
count, but the medium through 
wh ich the sh ifts are be ing conveyed 
- televis ion. Te lev ision is terrific at 
conveying emotional sincerity, And 
Sadat has conveyed the impreSSion 
that he has been governed by deep 
emotiona l convictions. The Israeli 
leaders wil l take no emotiona l leaps 
of fa ith when it comes to riski ng sur-
vival. For them, each step and each 
concess ion must be calcul ated in 
t erms of its risk to their se l f-defence 
capabilit'i es, and ca lculat ion com es 
across on te lev ision as mere cle ver-
ness. Further, the te levi sion medium 
is not the best too l to convey ana ly-
t ic distinctions between security in 
general and security postulated on 
an ability to defend oneself. 
Fi nall y, te levision is great in follow-
ing and buildi ng <J sing le star. Sadat 
is the lone star in the Egyptian 
camp. Is rael speaks with a number 
of voices . On the role of the sett le-
ments, internal ambiva lence over 
their ro le - whether they exist for 
defence purposes or as gestures to 
assert an Israe li claim to Judea and 
Samaria - has been clearly COI11 -
municated to the North American 
pub lic. 
So Israe l comes across as a some-
what confused but clever and calcu-
lating nation in contrast to an emo-
tiona ll y sincere Sadat, whose con-
trad ictions then appear as f lexibility 
since the cri te ri a on w hich media 
awards are be ing given do not in-
clude a "steadfast " factor in one's 
ab il ity to defend oneself or to ad-
here to covenants and agreements, 
but one's degree of flex ibi l ity. 
This loss in the media war, which 
Israel can do littl e to counte r is the 
deep, long range danger to Israel's 
pos ition. It is the real fallout of 
Sad at's visit to Jeru salem. 
